واشینگتن پست، نوزدهم اوت۲۰۲۴
از ایران و روسیه، دروغپراکنی در جریان است. هدف آمریکاست
با کمک هوش مصنوعی، روسیه اکنون کمپین نفوذ شرورانه خود را به جریان انداخته است
سرمقاله -
شرکت هوش مصنوعی اوپن ای آی(OpenAI) روز جمعه اعلام کرد که یک کمپین مخفی ایرانی را با استفاده از ابزار چت جی پی تی(ChatGPT) خود برای ایجاد پست‌های رسانه‌های اجتماعی و مقالات طولانی برای تأثیرگذاری بر رأی‌دهندگان آمریکایی در مورد نامزدهای سیاسی در هر دو حزب مختل کرده است
کمپین مخفی ایرانی با اظهاراتی در مورد مد و زیبایی ظاهر شده است. معتبرتر این اختلال تا حدی بر اساس هشدار نهم اوت مرکز تحلیل تهدیدات مایکروسافت مبنی بر این بود که «بازیگران ایرانی اخیراً زمینه را برای عملیات‌های نفوذ با هدف مخاطبان آمریکایی فراهم کرده‌اند».
- آوریل هاینس، مدیر اطلاعات ملی، در 15 مه به کنگره گفت که چین، روسیه و ایران تهدیدهای اصلی هستند، اما روسیه به عنوان فعال ترین آنها برجسته است.
همه ربات ها یا اطلاعات نادرست موثر نیستند. کمپانی هوش مصنوعی اوپن آی گفت که آخرین تلاش ایران احتمالاً بیهوده بوده و به دست بسیاری از مردم نرسیده است. اما سیل کمپین های نفوذ شرورانه جدید ممکن است شناسایی نشده باشد و رای دهندگان ناآگاه را تحت تاثیر قرار دهد. چگونه مبارزه کنیم؟ یکی از راه‌ها این است که پلتفرم‌ها از قدرت هوش مصنوعی در برابر موج جزر و مدی اطلاعات نادرست استفاده کنند و از این فناوری برای شناسایی و افشای کمپین‌ها استفاده کنند. کنگره باید برنامه هایی را که به شهروندان در مورد فریب خوردن هشدار می دهد، تامین بودجه و ارتقا بدهد.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/08/19/russia-iran-ai-disinformation-election/
نیویورک تایمز هجدهم اوت۲۰۲۴
اسراییل یک شبح را کشت
بقلم سون انگل راسموسن و ادام شامدین و کاری کلر لین -[جزییات کشته شدن فواد شکر فرمانده و بنیانگذار حزب الله]
فؤاد شُکر(Shukr)، یکی از فرماندهان ارشد حزب‌الله و یکی از بنیان‌گذاران این گروه، پس از ۴ دهه گریختن از دستگیری توسط آمریکا به دلیل دخالتش در بمب‌گذاری سال ۱۹۸۳ که به کشته شدن ۲۴۱ نیروی نظامی آمریکایی در بیروت انجامید، در نهایت در ۳۰ ژوئیه ۲۰۲۳، طی یک حمله هوایی اسرائیل در ساختمانی مسکونی در محله ضاحیه بیروت کشته شد.
شُکر که از نزدیکان رهبر حزب‌الله، حسن نصرالله، بود، نقش مهمی در توسعه زرادخانه موشکی حزب‌الله ایفا کرد و فرماندهی درگیری‌های مرزی با اسرائیل را بر عهده داشت
با این حال، با وجود اینکه او یکی از مهم‌ترین شخصیت‌های تاریخ حزب‌الله بود، زندگی تقریباً نامرئی داشت و تنها در تجمعات کوچک از افراد باسابقه مورد اعتماد گروه ظاهر می‌شد. او اوایل امسال برای شرکت در مراسم خاکسپاری برادرزاده اش که در جنگ با اسرائیل کشته شده بود، به‌طور علنی اما فقط برای چند دقیقه ظاهر شد.
به گفته یکی از آشنایان. شُکر آن‌چنان پنهان‌کار بود که رسانه‌های لبنانی هنگام گزارش خبر مرگش، عکس‌های اشتباهی از یک فرد دیگر منتشر کردند.
- فرمانده‌ای که کمتر کسی او را می‌شناخت، به گفته یکی از مقامات حزب‌الله، آخرین روز عمر خود در ۳۰ ژوئیه، را در دفترش در طبقه دوم یک ساختمان مسکونی در محله ضاحیه در جنوب بیروت گذراند. او در طبقه هفتم همان ساختمان زندگی می‌کرد، احتمالاً برای محدود کردن نیاز به رفت‌وآمد در فضای باز. حسن نصرالله در سوگواری فؤاد شکر، گفت که تا چند ساعت قبل از مرگ با او در تماس بوده است.
- آن شب، به گفته مقام حزب‌الله، شُکر تماسی دریافت کرد که به او گفته شد به آپارتمانش در ۵ طبقه بالاتر برود. حدود ساعت ۷ بعدازظهر، مهمات اسرائیلی به آپارتمان و سه طبقه زیر آن اصابت کرد و شُکر، همسرش، دو زن دیگر و دو کودک کشته شدند. طبق گزارش وزارت بهداشت لبنان، بیش از ۷۰ نفر مجروح شدند.
تماسی که شُکر را به طبقه هفتم کشاند، جایی که به‌راحتی می‌توانست در میان ساختمان‌های اطراف هدف قرار گیرد، احتمالاً از سوی فردی بود که شبکه ارتباطات داخلی حزب‌الله را نقض کرده بود.
- به گفته مقام حزب‌الله. حزب‌الله و ایران همچنان در حال تحقیق درباره این نقص اطلاعاتی هستند، اما معتقدند که اسرائیل با استفاده از فناوری پیشرفته‌تر و هک کردن، گروه را در مقابله با نظارت شکست داده است.
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-israel-killed-a-ghost-73e6db68?page=1
WP
Opinion
From Iran and Russia, the disinformation is now. The target is America.
With help from AI, Russia now supercharged its malign influence campaign.
By the Editorial Board
August 19, 2024 at 6:45 a.m. EDT
The artificial-intelligence company OpenAI announced Friday that it disrupted a covert Iranian campaign using its ChatGPT tool to create social media posts and long-form articles to influence American voters about political candidates in both parties, spiced up with remarks about fashion and beauty to look more authentic. The disruption was based in part on the Aug. 9 warning from Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center that “Iranian actors have recently laid the groundwork for influence operations aimed at US audiences.”
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If this sounds like a repeat of the 2016 presidential campaign, with foreign nations trying to interfere in U.S. democracy, it is. And Iran is not alone. Russia has also been heavily engaged, and both the scale and sophistication of its efforts have grown immensely, thanks to AI.
As details emerge about Iran’s efforts, consider this: Last year on social media, “Sue Williamson” posted a video of Russian President Vladimir Putin declaring that the war in Ukraine is not a territorial conflict or a matter of geopolitical balance but, rather, the “principles on which the New World Order will be based.” Although Ms. Williamson’s account included a photo of her smiling, she did not exist. According to the Justice Department, she was a bot, a digital warrior for Russia, created using generative AI to sow discord in the United States and elsewhere.
According to court documents filed by the FBI this summer, “Sue Williamson” was one of 968 bots created by the Russians on social media platform X. Assembled by covert AI software known as Meliorator, the bots can be swiftly programmed to respond to world events and are authentic in appearance. Though past malign influence campaigns on the internet required some painstaking human trial and error, Russia has now supercharged the process to spread disinformation at high speed and on industrial scale.
Details exposed by the FBI link the effort to the Kremlin. The bot farm was organized by the deputy editor of RT, the Russian state-owned television propaganda network, with help from the Federal Security Service, or FSB, the successor to the Soviet KGB. The bot farm used software that programmed “souls” and “thoughts” for the bot personalities to make them appear real. Next, the Russians obtained and controlled domain names from a U.S.-based provider, allowing them to use emails to crank out hundreds of fictitious social media accounts. The accounts presented their influence efforts in a folksy “over the back fence” style.
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told Congress May 15 that China, Russia and Iran are the leading threats, but Russia stands out as the most active. A June report by Beatriz Saab for the National Endowment for Democracy warned that AI is “reducing the cost, time, and effort required by authoritarian actors to both mass-produce and disseminate manipulative content with the aim of smearing opponents and promoting allies, exacerbating divisions in democratic societies.” In its annual report in October, Freedom House found that over the previous year, “the new technology was utilized in at least 16 countries to sow doubt, smear opponents, or influence public debate.”
The United States and other open societies must not be complacent. The latest Russian campaign was caught, fortunately, by law enforcement and intelligence agencies of the United States, Canada and the Netherlands. The domains were seized on grounds of possible money laundering. But it is likely there are many other still-undetected influence campaigns, and it is impossible to catch or stop them all with existing statutes. After all, open societies earn the designation by allowing free-flowing expression and debate.
Emily Harding of the Center for Strategic and International Studies points out that the U.S. government “is largely dependent on industry to keep the bot farms away.” Some platforms are making an effort, but others seem to be ineffective or not even trying. The U.S. government effort to fight foreign influence campaigns remains underfunded and understaffed; the State Department’s Global Engagement Center is being threatened by Congress with abolition.
Not all bots or disinformation actually work. Open AI said the latest Iranian effort was probably a dud and did not reach many people. But a flood of new malign influence campaigns might be undetected and could sway unsuspecting voters. How to fight back? One way is for the platforms to exploit the power of AI against the disinformation tidal wave, using the technology to spot and expose the campaigns. Congress ought to fund and upgrade programs that warn citizens against getting duped. And everyone should remain alert for more strangers named Sue peddling propaganda from a guy named Vladimir. He’s for real.
WSJ
How Israel Killed a Ghost
Hezbollah’s commander Fuad Shukr lived a life so secret few knew his name or face before an airstrike killed him and helped put the Middle East on the brink of war
By Sune Engel RasmussenFollow
, Adam Chamseddine and Carrie Keller-Lynn
Updated Aug. 18, 2024 12:00 am ET
BEIRUT—Fuad Shukr had eluded the U.S. for four decades, ever since a bombing killed 241 American servicemen in a Marine barracks in the Lebanese capital, which it says he helped plan. At the end of July, an Israeli airstrike found him on the seventh floor of a residential building not far away.
The militant was one of the U.S.-designated terrorist group Hezbollah’s founders and most senior operatives, a longtime trusted friend of the leader Hassan Nasrallah who played a key role in developing the missile arsenal that has made Hezbollah the world’s best-armed nonstate militia. For the past 10 months, he had commanded the group’s increasingly intense cross-border skirmishing with Israel.
Yet despite being one of the most important figures in Hezbollah’s history, he lived an almost invisible life, appearing only in small gatherings of the group’s trusted veterans. He emerged in public early this year to attend the funeral of a nephew killed fighting Israel—but only for a couple of minutes, an acquaintance said. Shukr was so secretive that Lebanese media outlets reporting on his death published photos of the wrong man.
The commander few people knew spent his last day, July 30, in his office on the second floor of a residential building in the southern Beirut neighborhood of Dahiyeh, a Hezbollah official said. He lived on the seventh floor of the same building, likely to limit the need to move around in the open. Nasrallah said during his eulogy for Shukr that he had been in touch with him until just hours before his death.
That evening, according to the Hezbollah official, Shukr received a call from someone telling him to go to his apartment five floors up. Around 7 p.m., Israeli munitions slammed into the apartment and the three floors underneath, killing Shukr, his wife, two other women and two children. More than 70 people were injured, according to the Lebanese Health Ministry.
The call to draw Shukr to the seventh floor, where he would be easier to target amid the surrounding buildings, likely came from someone who had breached Hezbollah’s internal communications network, the official said. Hezbollah and Iran continue to investigate the intelligence failure but believe that Israel beat the group’s countersurveillance with better technology and hacking, the official said.
The killing was a major blow to Hezbollah, taking out one of the group’s best strategists and exposing the degree to which its operations have been penetrated. Paired with the death hours later of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in a suspected Israeli attack in Tehran, it also pushed the Middle East to the brink of a regional war that the U.S. is scrambling to head off.
“These targeted killings have a cumulative effect on the operational capability of the organization,” said Carmit Valensi, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and expert on Hezbollah, referring to the Lebanese group.
“He was a source of knowledge,” she said of Shukr. “He knew how to work and communicate with Nasrallah. They spoke the same language.”
Shukr lived nearly his entire adult life at the heart of Hezbollah’s operations and decision-making and was a key link between the group and its main benefactor, Iran. In 1982, still in his early 20s, he helped organize Shiite guerrilla fighters in Beirut to oppose Israel’s invasion of Lebanon during its civil war.
After Israel laid siege to Beirut that year, the resistance retreated to the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, where it made contact with about 1,500 members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who had arrived through Syria. Shukr at the time worked for the General Directorate of General Security, Lebanon’s government intelligence agency.
He was asked to escort a group of Iranian diplomats from the Syrian border to the embassy in Beirut, according to Qassem Kassir, a political analyst familiar with Hezbollah who had known Shukr since the early 1980s. The diplomats were abducted along the way—allegedly by the Lebanese Forces, an armed Christian faction—and never seen again. Shukr, as a state security employee, was let go.
Known by his nom de guerre, Hajj Mohsin, Shukr became the point man between the Iranians and the camp they established in the Bekaa to train Hezbollah militants, said Kassir, who worked at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut at the time. Shukr later traveled to Iran to oversee the training of elite Hezbollah forces.
Early in the morning of Oct. 23, 1983, a truck bomb containing an estimated 12,000 pounds of TNT exploded outside a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Hezbollah had yet to officially declare its existence, and a group called Islamic Jihad took responsibility. The U.S. later said Shukr played a key role in planning and executing the attack.
Hezbollah formally announced its formation in 1985, and Shukr became its first military commander. He continued to wage a guerrilla campaign in the south until Israeli forces fully withdrew from the country in 2000 and earned a reputation as a strategic thinker with knowledge of the entire region.
“We used to joke with him in our sessions and in our meetings, and say that the engine of his brain was working with terrible force,” Nasrallah said in his speech. “He had a wealth of ideas and suggestions, and we would say to him: ‘Sir, you have to be patient with us.’ ”
On June 14, 1985, a group of hijackers seized TWA Flight 847 after takeoff from Athens, and flew the plane back and forth between Beirut and Algiers for three days demanding the release of 700 prisoners held by Israel. Shukr helped plan the operation, according to Kassir, and shortly thereafter went underground as his notoriety spread throughout Beirut.
“He became invisible,” Shukr’s acquaintance said.
Shukr commanded the respect of Hezbollah’s rank and file and occasionally appeared from hiding. During protests in Beirut in 1993 against the Oslo peace accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, he personally intervened to convince a group of Hezbollah members to pull back from a clash with security forces and prevent bloodshed, this acquaintance said.
Some outings were more brazen. In 1996, after Israeli forces firing artillery shells killed more than 100 civilians sheltering in a United Nations compound in southern Lebanon, Shukr went on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Walking around the Kaaba, he led a large group of pilgrims in chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” said the acquaintance who accompanied him on the trip.
The secretive life took its toll on Shukr, who compensated for the time he lost seeing friends and associates by treating those around him, when he saw them, with extra attention and care, Kassir said. He was fiercely loyal to a close circle of friends, many of whom had come of age with him, including Nasrallah, who became Hezbollah chief in 1992 after Israel assassinated his predecessor.
“These high-rank military guys,” said Hanin Ghaddar, senior fellow and Hezbollah expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “are expected to have a very secretive life and mission—no public appearances, no photos to the public, and definitely no interactions with others in the Shia community.”
When the next devastating war hit Lebanon, in 2006, Shukr again was instrumental. He helped command the fighters who infiltrated northern Israel, killing eight soldiers and abducting two others, triggering a monthlong invasion that devastated parts of Lebanon.
After the war, Shukr oversaw a military buildup that expanded Hezbollah’s arsenal from some 15,000 rockets and missiles to about 150,000, including antiship and cruise missiles, drones, and rockets. He became the point man for Iran’s deliveries, through Syria, of components that turned unguided rockets into precision-guided ones, according to the Israeli military.
In 2008, Shukr’s friend and Hezbollah commander in chief Imad Mughniyeh was killed by a car bomb in a joint CIA-Mossad operation in Damascus, Syria. Mughniyeh was leaving a reception marking the anniversary of the Islamic Republic in Iran when he got into his car alone and a bomb hidden in a spare tire exploded.
In 2016, another Hezbollah friend Mustafa Badreddine was killed by an explosion, also in the Syrian capital. Hezbollah blamed Sunni militants for the killing, while Israel said he had been killed by his own men due to internal rivalries on Nasrallah’s orders.
Yet, in recent years Shukr appeared to grow more relaxed, Kassir said. His friends had been killed in Damascus, not Beirut, where a targeted assassination seemed unlikely.
“The rules of engagement with Israel were established,” Kassir said. “There were red lines.”
The rules held even after Oct. 7, when Hamas—a Hezbollah ally—attacked Israel and killed 1,200 people, most of them civilians, according to Israeli authorities. Hezbollah began firing at Israel the following day, setting off a back and forth in which Israel targeted and killed around 400 of the group’s operatives, including key commanders, but not in Beirut.
Nasrallah, concerned about the intelligence breakdowns that enabled the killings of his operatives, in February ordered his fighters and their families not to use smartphones: “Abandon your phone, disable it, bury it, lock it in a metal box,” he said. To prevent Israeli eavesdropping, Hezbollah resorted to using coded language not only on open channels but on their internal communications network as well, the Hezbollah official said.
Shukr came into Israel’s crosshairs after a rocket landed in a soccer field in Majdal Shams in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in late July, killing a dozen young people. Hezbollah denied involvement, but Israel blamed the group, saying the rocket was one of Hezbollah’s and came from Lebanon.
A damaged football pitch after a rocket strike in Majdal Shams, in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Photo: Menahem Kahana/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Early on the day Shukr was targeted, Hezbollah sent out orders for high-ranking commanders to disperse amid concerns they were at risk, the Hezbollah official said. After the strike, it wasn’t immediately clear whether he had been killed. Some in Hezbollah thought he might have heeded the evacuation orders and fled, the official said. It took a while to find his body. It had been flung into a neighboring building.
Shukr’s death finally brought him out of the shadows. At his eulogy, his face was printed on billboards and footage of his life on the battlefield was projected onto a large screen as a voice-over extolled his virtues at earsplitting volume.
He was buried in a public cemetery in Beirut alongside a young man who had died fighting in Syria, according to the fighter’s mother.
“We’d heard his name, but we never saw him,” said a young neighbor who sat on the pavement near the building where Shukr was killed. “He was like a ghost.”
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